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RESumo – o problema do conhecimen- 
to fácil tem sido definido na literatura 
epistemológica contemporânea com um 
problema que nasce de duas formas 
distintas. o propósito deste ensaio é 
mostrar que essas supostas maneiras 
diferentes de gerar o mesmo problema 
em verdade originam dois problemas dis- 
tintos, que requerem respostas distin- 
tas. um deles está relacionado à aqui- 
sição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento 
de primeira-ordem e o outro à aquisição 
fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de 
segunda-ordem. Além disso, é apresen- 
tada a maneira como o infinitismo, a 
teoria epistêmica segundo a qual as 
razões  que  justificam  uma  opinião 
devem ser infinitas em número e não-
repetidas,  pode  lidar  com  cada  um 
desses problemas.
PAlAVRAS-chAVE – ceticismo. Pro- 
blema do critério. Princípio do fechamento 
epistêmico. Problema do conhecimento 
fácil.
AbSTRAcT  –  The  Problem  of  Easy 
Knowledge has recently been defined 
as arising in two different forms: one 
connected with some version of the 
epistemic closure principle and the other 
with bootstrapping. This essay shows 
that these supposed two forms actually 
generate two quite different problems. 
one of them is related with the supposed 
easy (unacceptable) acquisition of first-
order knowledge, and the other with the 
supposed easy (unacceptable) acquisition 
of second-order knowledge, each of them 
requiring different solutions. It is also 
presented how Infinitism, the view that 
the structure of justificatory reasons is 
infinite and non-repeating, can deal with 
these two different challenges.
KEywoRdS – Skepticism. Problem of 
the criterion. closure Principle. Problem 
of Easy Knowledge. Epistemic level 
confusion.
The so-called Problem of Easy Knowledge has recently become a great 
focus of interest in epistemology. This is so, mainly, I think, due to Stewart 
cohen’s paper “basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”.1 
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Since then, much has been said about this problem and different solutions 
have been offered.2
despite cohen’s claims that “the Easy Knowledge Problem arises in 
two related ways”,3 there is neither one problem arising in two distinct 
manners nor a new epistemological problem being presented. Rather, 
what cohen calls “the problem of easy knowledge” seems to be more 
the result of a couple of misunderstandings, a combination of a high 
degree of epistemic level confusion and the renaming of very ancient 
philosophical challenges.
In the course of this paper I will try to show that cohen is dealing with 
not one, but two quite different problems. one problem has to do with 
an unacceptable way to come to know that we know things (and that 
looks pretty much like one alternative to resolve what in the pyrrhonian 
tradition has been called “the problem of the criterion”). The other 
involves our capacity to reason from appearances in order to establish 
what things really are.
1.  Epistemic levels
level confusion is not at all a new phenomenon in epistemology.4 I do 
not intend, though, to examine it in detail. I’m concerned with epistemic 
levels only to the extent it may cause difficulties for understanding the 
easy knowledge problem.
The first epistemic level, the level of first-order knowledge, is pertinent 
to our discussion as it deals with the conditions according to which a 
person S can know that some proposition p is true. This level could be 
understood as the most elementary one, the object of the larger part of 
epistemological parley.
when we get through the first level we do no more than take into 
account the conditions according to which a subject S knows that a 
proposition describing empirical events is true.
The first level in epistemology epitomizes the relation between a 
person’s beliefs about empirical events and the content of these beliefs.   
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In other words, the first level is confined on the affairs concerning the 
suitable connection between the beliefs and the truth, regardless the 
believer’s awareness of her believing, knowing or capturing the truth.
All Gettier cases, for example, are reduced to the epistemic first level 
since they are intended to show nothing else than that mere true justified 
belief does not count as (first order) knowledge. The Gettier cases deal 
with first order knowledge as they tackle only the subject’s oblivious 
competence in avoiding the accidental coincidence between justification 
and truth, i.e. the subject’s capacity of knowing some proposition that 
describes the world.
The second level, the level of second-order knowledge or meta-
knowledge, on the other hand, concerns the conditions according to 
which a person S can know that she knows some proposition p is true. 
now the picture changes radically. To begin with, one of the necessary 
conditions for second-order knowledge is first-order knowledge since it 
is not possible for any subject to know that she knows p is true if she 
doesn’t know p is true in the first place. The requirements for second 
order knowledge may very well include some (or even all) conditions for 
first order knowledge, but by necessity they will never be the same.
At the second level in epistemology we’ll emphasize the subject’s 
reflections on her knowing – or believing – that a proposition describing 
empirical events is true.
one way to describe the second level in epistemology is to say that it 
embodies the relation between a person who has beliefs about empirical 
events and her own believing. This relation brings in the person’s 
reflection on her specific epistemic condition. The second level is, in one 
way or another, related to the affairs concerning the connection between 
beliefs and truth as well, but in this case regarding the awareness of the 
believer on her believing, knowing or capturing the truth.
Another way to figure out the epistemological meta-level is to say 
that this level stands for the justification of knowledge claims. So, when 
we talk about meta-justification, we are talking about the justification 
of what we believe to be justified.
As a consequence, when we assume the conditions for first and 
second-order knowledge are equal, or we do not see the distinction 
between these two levels, we incur in epistemic level confusion.
The conclusion of any particular theory of knowledge may require a 
particular articulation between first and second epistemic levels. This 
doesn’t mean, however, that we are free to mix up the levels, since it is not 
clear at all that as soon as a person knows p is true she is automatically 
in the position to know that she knows p is true. That’s one of the main 
reasons why we always have to distinguish between levels clearly.112
Also depending on theory, huge differences in terms of the attributed 
importance to the levels will appear. Even while recognizing the possibility 
for second order knowledge, some epistemological theories are consistent 
with the idea that second order knowledge is simply not too important 
– at least, not essential. Accordingly, once the right conditions for first 
order knowledge are determined, the foremost job in epistemology is 
done and all the rest can be kept, with no cost whatsoever, in the realm 
of skepticism. These sorts of epistemological theories may end up having 
no qualms to attribute first order knowledge to anyone capable of meeting 
these conditions, like very young children, animals and virtually anything 
that may be capable of believing.5
on the other side of the spectrum, some theories will state that if a 
person knows p is true but doesn’t know that she knows p is true, she 
will find herself with empty hands. This is so, according to these theories, 
because the important philosophical aspects of knowledge are linked 
with some sort of appreciation that we know things. This way, knowing 
without knowing that one knows amounts to pretty much nothing. 
Expectedly, these theories will not be eager to concede knowledge to 
neither dogs nor children.6
different theories of knowledge will define in their own terms not 
only its subject of analysis but also the importance of theirs and other 
possible subject matters. In the same way a particular theory will define 
its scope and determine what is philosophically relevant to be analyzed 
and defined.
I believe that some of the recent epistemological debate about two 
senses of knowledge has to do with the difference about epistemic levels7. 
It has been said that one sense of “knowledge”, less philosophical and 
more mundane, could be completely analyzed in the terms suggested 
by some externalist-type theories. In contrast, the sense of “knowledge” 
more articulated and intelligent, the one menaced by skepticism, runs 
off from any externalist examination and could be grasped only by 
internalist-type theories.
This debate shows, again, the importance of keeping the distinction 
between epistemic levels up and clear. Even if we decide to break 
epistemology in two, each part dealing with a different sense of   
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knowledge, we still can’t forget that these two senses are but two distinct 
levels of knowledge, one exclusively portraying the connection between 
one’s beliefs and the truth and the other depicting the appreciation of 
the believer about this supposed connection.
It seems quite reasonable to me to believe that part of the misunder- 
standings regarding skepticism – particularly pyrrhonian skepticism – are 
due to the fact the epistemic levels are not clearly distinguished. As we’ll 
see a little latter, Sextus Empiricus himself seems to be one of the main 
sources for epistemological level confusion. once we realize that some 
of the skeptical challenges are directed to meta-knowledge, as it seems 
to be the case with the problem of the criterion, and others to first-order 
knowledge, as it seems to be the case with the epistemic regress brought 
about by Agripa’s trilemma, we’ll not only have a better understanding 
over skepticism, but also will be in a better position to deal with them.
2.  The closure principle
As it was said at the beginning, according to cohen “the Easy 
Knowledge Problem arises from two related ways”.8 As I understand it, it 
means that there exist two ways to raise the same problem. one of them 
is via bootstrapping; the other one is through the closure principle. we’ll 
see that the problem with bootstrapping has to do with illegitimately 
acquiring second-order knowledge. but first, we will examine what 
kind of problem, and what kind of easy knowledge, may emerge from 
the closure principle.
when we consider the closure principle under the strict optic of 
epistemology, all we say is that knowledge is “closed” under logical 
implication. This roughly means that if we know some proposition p, and 
this proposition logically implies another proposition, q, we also know q. 
The idea is that we can increase the set of proposition we know to the 
extent of what is implied by this original set of known propositions.
I do not intend to offer a flawless formulation of the closure principle 
here. Rather, I want to discuss a few points that will give us a clear idea 
about what is epistemologically important about the closure principle. I 
think that, at least for now, more important than reaching an unblemished 
presentation of the closure principle is to understand what is behind 
this principle and why sometimes it is thought that we will be better off 
rejecting it.
In a first attempt, the closure principle could be expressed like this: 
if a person, S, knows p, and p implies q, then S knows q.
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Even though this first formulation captures the key idea behind 
the closure principle, we can add to it some clause that closes the 
closure principle under the realm of S’s conscience. This way, we can 
avoid unnecessary complications that we’ll go over briefly. So we 
can reformulate the closure principle like this: if a person, S, knows a 
proposition p, and S implies q from p, then S knows q.
depending on the way we formulate the closure principle, we can 
make it either obviously false or even more strikingly appealing. we can 
see that when we change the predicate that works as its operator. If we 
say, for example: if p is true and p implies q, then q is true, the principle 
will maintain the same structure as epistemic the closure principle but 
will appear to be much beyond reasonable complains. This is so because 
nobody will be ready to deny that the predicate “truth” is closed under 
logical implication.
however, if we change the epistemic operator, “to know” for “to 
believe” things will seem completely different. If we formulate the principle 
like this: if a person, S, believes a proposition p and p implies q, then S 
believes q, the closure principle will be bluntly false. This is so because, 
as a matter of fact, our believing is not closed under logical implications.
It is possible to point out problems with closure based on the 
inapplicability of closure to believing. For if knowledge requires, among 
other things, a belief and the believing is not closed under logical 
implication, so knowledge cannot be closed under implication as well.
This is probably true, but if we continue in this direction we’ll end up 
lost in epistemologically irrelevant problems. The same happens when 
we dispute over the fact that S must somehow “see”, or perform, the 
logical implication between p and q. All these non-epistemic problems 
with the closure principle can be settled by adding some restrictions and 
constraints over the applicability of the principle. In my opinion, this is 
a fine and important task. however, we can keep all these additional 
complications aside.
The important aspect is this: what is distinctively relevant about 
knowledge,  that  of  which  our  knowledge  is  made  of,  epistemic 
justification or whatever it may be, seems indeed to be closed under 
logical implication. There is something deeply intuitive about the fact that 
if I have epistemic justification for believing a proposition that describes 
empirical events – even if I do not have the belief itself already formed – 
and this first proposition logically implies another one of the same type, 
I do not lose any justification for believing in the implied proposition. In 
this respect, the closure principle poses that, in the same way as truth, 
something important about our knowledge is preserved along with 
logical implication.115
It is worthwhile to mention that one reason that has been put forth 
to reject the closure principle is the alleged fact that it would lead to 
skepticism. In the one version of cartesian (or academic) skepticism an 
instance of the closure principle is used as premise for the conclusion 
that knowledge in unattainable.
The skeptical argument goes like this: 1) If I know some ordinary 
proposition p – that I’m in Rosario, for example – then I know that q, a 
proposition that is inconsistent with p, but that could be true regardless 
the empirical evidence I have for p – that I’m in Philadelphia dreaming 
that I’m in Rosario, for example – is false; 2) I don’t know q is false – I 
don’t know that I’m not in Philadelphia dreaming that I am in Rosario; 
therefore 3) I don’t know p – I don’t know I’m in Rosario.
I will not discuss the skeptical argument in any detail now. I just want 
to point out that the first premise is an instance of the closure principle 
and the skeptical argument can be easily generalized in order to include 
any descriptive proposition like p.
Since the argument is valid, the only way to reject the skeptical 
conclusion established in 3 is to refuse one of the premises. If the chosen 
premise is 2, the dispute will be directed over the closure principle.
That strategy for dealing with this type of skeptical argument is one 
of the main reasons for rejecting the closure principle. I think, however, 
that that strategy is misguided. This is so because the closure principle 
is neutral regarding the skeptical conclusion. It can straightforwardly 
be seen once we change the form of this kind of skeptical argument 
from a modus tollens to a modus ponens. This way we’ll observe that the 
potentially skeptical premise is 2, not 1. differently from the first premise, 
it is the second one that hides regulations on our evidences to believe 
descriptive propositions, and it is this sort of evidential restrictions that, 
bottom-line, makes the skeptical conclusion possible.
If we keep the first premise, and consequently do not quarrel over the 
closure principle, but change the second one, we can have an argument 
like this: 1) If I know some ordinary proposition p – that I’m in Rosario, 
for example – then I know that q, a proposition that is inconsistent with 
p – hat I’m in Philadelphia dreaming that I’m in Rosario, for example – is 
false; 2) I do know that p is true; therefore 3) I do know that q is false – I 
do know that I’m not in Philadelphia dreaming that I’m in Rosario.
The latter argument shows that the closure principle can be used for 
skeptical and non-skeptical purposes as well. hence, it is false that there 
is something in closure that motivates skepticism.
In the following discussion no details about the closure principle will 
be necessary. As we will see, the closure principle has little to do with 
the kind of troubles cohen envisions with his easy knowledge problem 116
and a preliminary understanding of the closure principle will be enough 
for this purpose.
3.  Closure and easy knowledge
cohen’s argument against the closure principle has a form of a reductio 
ad absurdum. Since we have unacceptable results from using the closure 
principle, we should reject it. According to cohen, the closure principle 
would help us to increase our knowledge however in an unacceptable 
fashion, since the kind knowledge we can acquire from using the closure 
principle is “easy”.
he describes his concerns as follows:
“If I know the table is red on the basis of its looking red, then it follows by 
the closure principle that I can know that it’s not the case that the table is 
white but illuminated by red lights. Presumably, I cannot know that it’s not 
the case that the table is white illuminated by red lights, on the basis of the 
table’s looking red.”  9
Apparently, the problem is that it would be all too easy to come to 
know that the table is not white but illuminated by red lights on the 
basis of its red looking. The point for him, it seems so, is to try to show 
that there is something wrong with the closure principle, something 
that would allows us to know that the table is not white but illuminated 
by red lights on the basis of the table’s looking red. It’s very important 
to notice that cohen is arguing that the reason for rejecting the closure 
principle is that this principle allows us to come to know the table is not 
white but illuminated by red lights on the basis of its looking red.
This rejection of the closure principle is anchored on the indisputable 
fact that if the table were not red but rather white illuminated by red 
lights, the table would continue to look red. In this case, we would have 
a white table that looks red and, according to him, the closure principle 
would allow us to conclude, on the basis of the red looking of the table, 
that the white table is not really white but red.
what cohen calls, then, “easy” is our knowledge that the table is not 
white but illuminated by red lights, and what makes things appealing 
is that this easy knowledge can be attained because of closure, a very 
popular principle in epistemology.
we should keep in mind at this moment that (1) cohen thinks that 
the closure principle should be rejected for it permits us to conclude that 
one table that looks red is not white but illuminated by red lights; that 
item of knowledge is illegitimate easy knowledge and (2) whether cohen   
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is misguided or not, that item of illegitimate easy knowledge is clearly 
first-order knowledge.
In “closure matters”,10 Peter Klein argues that the question is rather 
whether it is possible to know that the table is red by reasoning from the 
table looks red, and not the following move – which involves the closure 
principle – from the table is red to the table is not white but illuminated 
by red lights.
If we consider the three following steps, (1) it looks red, (2) it is red, 
and (3) it is not white but illuminated by red lights, the controversial 
move is from the first step to the second, and not from the second to the 
third, the one that actually includes the closure principle.
This is so because if I can know that the table is red on the basis 
of its looking red, there is no problem with the inference from “it’s red” 
to “it’s not white but illuminated by red lights”. closure just allows us 
to conclude: “the table is not white but illuminated by red lights” from 
“the table is red”. The problem here is to decide if it is possible (and, of 
course, specify under which conditions this would be possible) to reason 
from “the table looks red” to “the table is red” and not the further step, 
when we use the closure principle to increase our knowledge, from “it’s 
red” to “it’s not white but illuminated by red lights”.
If that is right, the only easy knowledge problem is that it is not easy 
to see what could be the problem with closure in this context. The idea 
of a reductio argument showing that we have problems with the closure 
principle ignores the most important point: the problem pointed out by 
cohen is rather related to deciding how much a theory will allows us to 
trust in the way things appear to us.
cohen’s idea, that the closure principle should be rejected because it 
would allows us to conclude that something is not white but illuminated 
by red lights on the base of the red looking of the thing, seems just wrong. 
This is so because closure does not permit that. closure leads to the 
conclusion that something is not white but illuminated by red lights from 
“the thing is red,” not from “the thing looks red.” The epistemological 
discussion here has little to do with the closure principle, but rather 
with whether we can know the table is red based on the red looking of 
the table.
The only possible easy knowledge is that the table is red based on the 
table’s looking red. cohen’s insistence on the third part of the argument–
the part that goes from “it’s red” to “it’s not white but illuminated by 
red lights” – only shows that there may be something wrong with the   
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first step of the argument – the step that goes from “it’s look red” to 
“it’s red”. but this, again, shows nothing epistemically wrong about the 
closure principle.
In pointing out that there should be something wrong with the 
closure principle in the acquisition of illegitimate easy knowledge, 
cohen somehow misplaced the real philosophical discussion and, at the 
same time, he called attention to his easy knowledge problem. despite 
of other differences of opinions, the real disagreement between Klein 
and cohen is much less about the closure principle than it is about 
the first step in the reasoning, the one that goes from “it looks red” to   
“it’s red”.
Klein claims that there is nothing incorrect, in any respect, with the 
closure principle. however, much more interesting in this context is that 
he seems to think that the conclusion that something is red on the basis 
of its red looks may be, under certain circumstances, just a fine way of 
reasoning. The red appearance of a table can be seen, according to Klein, 
as a clue about its redness, since, he claims, things that are red used to 
have this red appearance.11
It could be said that we may know the table is red on the basis of its 
looking red if we have no defeaters. So, the red appearance of the table 
may be an appropriate way to come to know the table is red, under certain 
circumstances – namely, no defeater circumstances. Klein assumes that 
the red appearance of the table, under the no-defeaters circumstance, is 
a good indication of the redness of the table – because red things have 
this “tendency” to appear red. how does he know that red things have 
a tendency to appear red? well, that’s another story. what is essential 
now is that he is trying to provide a rationale according to which we can 
reason from “the table looks red” to “the table is red”.
If we assume for a minute that Klein is in the right path when he says 
that the controversial move from “it’s look red” to “it’s red”, but this move 
may not be problematic at all, it would be odd to expect him to blame the 
closure principle for any sort of expansion of our knowledge. For if one 
sees nothing absurd in going from “the table looks red” to “the table is 
red”, one will be ready to accept the conclusion “the table is not white 
but illuminated by red lights”.
on the other hand, cohen seems to think that we can’t possibly know 
that the table is red based on its red appearance. he seems to be bothered 
with the fact that we have no reason to think that red things have 
tendencies to look red. however, stressing the last part of the argument, 
the part where the closure principle plays a role, can only make case for   
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the implausibility of the first step of the argument. The best that could be 
said would be something like this: “look, we can’t accept to go from “the 
table appears red” to “it is red” because once we do that we may also go, 
using the closure principle, to “the table is not white but illuminated by 
red lights”. but, again, the last part of the argument is just a freeloading 
discussion derived from the main disagreement exposed in the first part, 
the one in which we reach implications from “it is red”.
Thus,  the  real  disagreement  is  about  whether  we  can  know 
things are based on the way they look, a disagreement as old as 
philosophy itself, not about the closure principle. what cohen seems 
to do is to use the closure principle to try to make a stronger case 
about the impossibility of knowing the table is red based on it’s red   
appearances.
It’s not my purpose to discuss here whether we can know how 
things are based on the way they appear to us – that would be way too 
much for this paper. what is important at this time is to realize that the   
so-called problem of easy knowledge neither involves closure nor 
presents any epistemological novelty. There is nothing in the problem of 
easy knowledge that even calls for a defense of the closure principle as 
well, since the epistemological question at stake does not involve the 
closure principle. The only “easy” thing is that is too “easy” to know how 
things are based on the way things look and not the logical consequences 
that follow from our knowledge the way things are, which does involves 
the closure principle.
wherever this discussion ends, what is decisive here is the fact that 
all knowledge implicated so far cannot be considered, by any means, 
second-order knowledge. Even if the analysis of this part of cohen’s 
problem of easy knowledge is wrong, there is no possible way we could 
consider the easily acquired knowledge in the case involving the closure 
principle second-order knowledge. That is important for in what follows 
we’ll see that the other way the problem of easy knowledge arises relates 
to a very different kind of knowledge, one kind that involves knowledge 
of knowledge claims.
4.  Bootstrapping and easy knowledge
The starting point of what is now called “problem of easy knowledge” 
was aimed to be a criticism against some forms of externalism. This 
seems to have been one of Fumerton’s points in “metaepistemology 
and Skepticism” and, more recently, in Vogel’s “Reliabilism leveled”. 
we could say that in both cases the objection against externalism was 
based on the idea that theories like Reliabilism would permit what was 
called “bootstrapping”.120
bootstrapping was considered then a strongly counterintuitive 
strategy. To sum up the idea, bootstrapping serves to transform the belief 
that results from a process of belief formation into the very proof of the 
reliability of that process.
we can start thinking of bootstrapping through the following example: 
michael is driving his car and then he watches the gas gauge’s needle. 
The gauge’s needle says that the tank is full. Then, he comes to believe 
that the tank is full. This belief is based on a process supposedly quite 
reliable, the gauge’s needle indicating that the tank is full. From his 
belief that the tank is full he comes to believe that the gauge is reliable. 
now, he is basing the belief about the reliability of the gauge in another 
belief, which results from the pure observation of the gauge’s needle. 
In doing so, he comes to know that he knows the tank is full, since he 
now knows the gauge is reliable. The question is: what is the problem   
with that?
The problem is that the same strategy could be used even if the gauge 
was broken. of course, if the gauge were broken it would seem wrong to 
allow using a belief that is formed from what the gauge’s needle indicates 
to support a belief about the reliability of the gauge. In both cases, when 
the gauge’s needle is working well and when the gauge’s needle is 
broken, the strategy to bootstrap is the same, but the results are quite 
different – in one case he knows that the tank is full, but in the other he 
doesn’t. The problem with bootstrapping is that we will get the same 
result “the gauge is reliable” independently of the reliability of the gauge. 
That is the reason we must refuse bootstrapping. Thus, bootstrapping 
delivers second-order knowledge we actually do not have.12
The gas tank example is original from michael williams’s “unnatural 
doubts”. The example emerges precisely from a discussion about 
externalism. williams states the same conclusion although only thinking 
on externalism. According to him, “It is perfectly true that I do not learn 
that the gauge is working properly simply by learning that the tank is 
full. but what I do learn, that the tank is full, does not entail what I don’t, 
that the gauge is working properly. If the needle is stuck on ‘F’, the tank 
may or may not be full. what is true is that, in particular circumstances, 
I may have no way of distinguishing the case in which my belief that the 
tank is full amounts to knowledge from that in which, even if it happens 
to be true, it does not”.13 So, the problem with bootstrapping is that we 
justify a knowledge claim in a vicious way.
12  For a detailed version of bootstrapping cf. Tito Flores, Infinitism, knowing that one 
knows and the problem of the criterion, in: Veritas, 50 (2005), p. 109-128.
13  cf. michael williams, Unnatural doubts, p. 347.121
The feature that appears to permit bootstrapping would lie in the very 
core of reliabilism: we could come to know some proposition, p, using 
some reliable method, m, with no necessity for us to either know or to be 
justified in believing (or to have some justification for believing or even 
identify the method used) the method used were in fact reliable.
In “Externalism and Skepticism”, michael bergman pointed out that 
bootstrapping could be a problem not only to externalist theories like 
reliabilism, as was the original idea, but to internalist theories as well. 
cohen in his “basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge” 
perhaps made this point even more explicit.
cohen claimed that the problem of easy knowledge threatens all 
theories that adopt a “basic knowledge structure”. by cohen’s definition, 
a basic knowledge structure is one that permits that “a belief source can 
deliver knowledge prior to one’s knowing that the source is reliable and 
hold that reliability knowledge is based on basic knowledge”.14 he then 
claimed that, in principle, a basic Knowledge Structure could shape not 
only externalist theories but also internalist ones.
This idea seems quite exciting. The intended criticism seems to be 
directed less toward some possible distinction between internalism and 
externalism in epistemology and more toward the following, and more 
interesting, question: should any epistemological theory assume that the 
individual’s awareness of her own evidential basis plays a decisive role 
in the justification of whatever beliefs the individual has?
one of cohen’s merits is the way in which he unifies the criticism for 
both externalism and internalism. According to him, many externalist 
as well as internalist theories do not accept what he calls KR Principle. 
This principle states that: “a potential knowledge source K can yield 
knowledge for S only if S knows K is reliable”.15
of course, despite the vocabulary used, such a principle will suit any 
sort of internalist theory. KR principle can be read like this: a potential 
evidence E can justify a belief b for S only if S knows (or has evidence) 
E is good evidence for b. The main idea KR principle conveys is that 
the mere fact that E is good evidence, or that source K is reliable, isn’t 
sufficient for S to be justified, or to know, some proposition on the basis 
of that evidence or knowledge source. For using a belief that results from 
certain process to prove the reliability of that process is equivalent of 
using a belief p, that is justified by the reason r, to show that r is a good 
reason to believe p. Such a move is possible because, according to some   
 
14  cf. Stewart cohen, why basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge, op. cit., p. 311.
15  cf. Stewart cohen, basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge, op. cit., 
p. 309.122
internalist theories, it is not necessary for S to have justification to believe 
that r is, in fact, a good reason to believe p in order to have justification 
to be believe p on the basis of r in the first place.
As I think is clear, when we have a true belief that results from reliable 
method of belief formation, such belief can be prized as “knowledge”. And 
when we know the reliable method used is in fact reliable, we know that 
we know that proposition. In a passage from Goldman’s “Epistemology 
and cognition”, that says, “to know that we know we would have to 
know that we use reliable processes of belief formation”.16
In denying KR principle, a theory assumes a basic knowledge 
structure. consequently, a principle like KR would be assumed just 
for those theories according to which it is impossible to be justified 
– or to know something – unless we have some justification that the 
reasons, or methods of belief formation, we use are epistemically   
appropriate.
In this sense, the dispute over KR principle involves theories according 
to which we can know things without knowing that we know and theories 
according to which we can’t know without knowing that we know.
If that is right, what cohen calls KR principle could be seen as the 
pyrrhonian assumption that poses the problem of the criterion. If the 
problem of the criterion is “a meta-epistemological problem concerning 
the justification of first order knowledge claims among disagreeing 
disputants”,17 the KR principle seems to be a clear way to make this 
disagreement explicit. In other words, when disputants disagree about 
the justification of first-order knowledge claims, they disagree over the 
acceptance of a principle like KR.
It seems quite patent, then, that KR Principle and problem of the 
criterion have a meta-epistemological nature. The problem of the criterion 
is a meta-epistemological problem, in the sense that it is not a problem 
about whether we can know but rather it is a problem about whether 
we can justify our first-order knowledge claims.
This important feature of the problem of the criterion was made clear 
by chisholm, when he revitalized it in contemporary epistemology some 
years ago. As it was considered in the pyrrhonian tradition, chisholm 
describes the problem of the criterion as one concerning “decisions”. 
According to him, the problem of the criterion was “how do we decide, in 
any particular case, whether we have a genuine item of knowledge?”18. 
The problem of the criterion is not about the specification of the necessary   
 
16  cf. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 56.
17  cf. Roberto Amico, The Problem of the Criterion, p. 143.
18  cf. Roderick chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, p. 62.123
and sufficient conditions for knowing. Again, the trouble is rather about 
whether we can know that we know.
After all, the meta-epistemological nature of the problem of the 
criterion and, consequently, of the bootstrapping problem–given that the 
former seems to be a predicament derived from an alternative response 
to the problem of the criterion – is in perfect harmony with the original 
inspiration of the criticism against reliabilism. For Vogel, for example, “[a 
form of reliabilism that he called neighborhood Reliabilism] is too weak. 
It would allow us higher-level knowledge we do not have”.19 If this is 
right, the bootstrapping problem must be understood as the problem of 
the easiness of a certain strategy of acquiring second-order knowledge.
So, it is correct to say that bootstrapping problem is a consequence 
of a certain strategy to deal with the problem of the criterion. more 
specifically, and using cohen’s terms, the bootstrapping problem is a 
consequence of trying to resolve the problem of the criterion avoiding 
the KR principle by means of a basic knowledge structure view.
In this sense, the problem with bootstrapping emerges when using a 
certain strategy to resolve a second-order problem, which could be well 
represented by the knowledge of the reliability of a knowledge source, 
provided that knowing the source used to come to know a proposition p 
is reliable means knowing that we know p.
when we bootstrap we manage a certain way to come to know that 
we know – e.g. to come to know we use a reliable process. The relation 
between the bootstrapping problem and the problem of the criterion 
is fruitful because it reassures the meta-epistemological character of 
the problem of easy knowledge. out of this relation we can then better 
understand what kind of knowledge is easy knowledge.
In order to notice why bootstrapping is a strategy to deal with the 
problem of the criterion, we have to understand what is the pyrrhonian 
view on bootstrapping.
According to Sextus:
“For the proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion also 
a proof to demonstrate its truth; and neither can a proof be sound without 
the previous existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be true without 
the previous confirmation of the proof. So in this way both the criterion and 
the proof are involved in the circular process of reasoning.”20
Granted, we can’t accept anything when its proof hangs on circular 
reasoning. And what seems to be the main problem here is the impossibility 
of establishing a criterion using whatever the criterion itself proves to be   
 
19  cf. Jonathan Vogel, Reliabilism leveled, in: Journal of Philosophy, p. 612.
20  cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.114-117.124
the case. To judge our knowledge claims, we ought to have a criterion 
– in order to know whether the belief b is a genuine item of knowledge, 
we need a criterion according to which we will decide such matter. we 
can know that we know p if we know that the belief formation process 
is in fact reliable. but how do we know the belief formation process is 
in fact reliable? If we answer this question pointing out the belief b, a 
belief that is sanctioned by the criterion as a case of knowledge, we will 
be caught into the diallelus.
on the other hand, the typical circular reasoning is meant to be close 
up under the same epistemic level (as it is showed, for example, by 
another pyrrhonian argument, Agripa’s trilemma or the infinite regress 
argument). The main idea of Agripa’s trilemma is that in order for S to 
have justification to believe b on the basis of a reason R, S will also have 
to have justification to believe R. Granted, b and R must be related in a 
very distinctive form so R can be a proper epistemic ground for b. yet 
nothing is said, at least in this kind of regress, about the necessity for S 
to have any reason to believe that R confers a proper epistemic ground 
for b.
The circle shaped by Agripa’s trilemma materializes when I use 
a reasoning that goes like this: my justification to believe b is R; my 
justification to believe R is S and my justification to believe S is b. This 
way I’m looping inside the same epistemic level.
In the bootstrapping case, the kind of circularity involved has to 
do with proving the reasons used are appropriate, and in this way we 
jump up between levels. In this meta-regress, I use my belief b, which is 
epistemically grounded by my other belief R, to prove that R is a proper 
epistemic base for b.
As it looks, there are two types of circular reasoning, a first-order 
circular reasoning and a second-order circular reasoning. In order to 
understand the difference between them we have to remember the 
epistemological level distinction. Albeit both types have the same 
characteristic of avoiding the onus of proving the premise basing it on 
the previous acceptance of the conclusion – what makes them fallacies 
of petitio principii – the result of each circular reasoning will change. 
In one case, my belief b is part of a reasoning chain that justifies b 
itself; in another case, b is used in a reasoning chain that is intended 
to demonstrate that the grounds for b are epistemically suitable. In one 
case b is used to provide justification for itself; in the other, b is used to 
provide meta-justification for itself.
The circular reasoning that has to do with the problem of criterion – 
and, hence, bootstrapping – is, lets say, vertical. It relates to a movement 
from first to second level. In this form of circular reasoning the circle goes 125
from first to second level, and we try to establish that we have a genuine 
item of knowledge using a criterion that is proved by a knowledge (claim) 
that was, in turn, legitimated by the criterion itself.
This significant difference about the two types of circularities is not 
detected by Sextus. That’s why he is one source for level confusion. 
Even though he provides, two distinct arguments, he fails to notice the 
difference – at least, he falls short of making it unambiguous.
A different way to understand these two different circular reasoning 
is to consider Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): to be 
justified in believing one proposition p, on the basis of another proposition 
E, one must be (1) justified in believing E and (2) justified in believing 
that E makes probable p.21
There would be many things to say about this principle. however, the 
idea now is just to give an example of how create two different kinds of 
epistemic regresses that, by consequence, can create two different kinds 
of circular reasoning.
According to PIJ, in order to have an appropriate evidence to believe 
b, or to have justification to believe b, we must have to deal with two 
different chains of reasoning: one implied by the first clause, that will 
trigger a first-order regress, and another implied by the second clause, 
that will start a second-order, or meta-regress.
one noticeable aspect of PIJ is that it requires meta-justification as a 
condition for first order justification. Thus, in order to have justification to 
believe b we’ll altogether need some sort of meta-justification for b.
The first clause of PIJ triggers a chain of reasoning such as Agripa’s 
trilemma. In order to have a justified belief that owes its justification 
to some reason – or evidence, etc. – we’ll be forced to go further ad 
infinitum, or reasoning in a circle, or stopping at a certain point. All of 
these possibilities, though, are inserted in the same epistemic level.
The second clause, however, sets off a slightly different array of 
possibilities. The type of regress we deal with then, the regress of meta-
justification, forces us not to put forward reasons for the beliefs we have, 
but reasons for the epistemic quality of our reasons.
Thus, in the same way we can create either an infinite, more complex, 
regress of meta-justification or an infinite, less complex, regress of 
justification, we can create either a circular reasoning of justification or a 
circular reasoning of meta-justification. Again, in one case we are offering 
reasons to believe a certain proposition; in the other we are presenting a 
reason that we do have good reasons to believe what we believe.
21  cf. Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, p. 36.126
So, what has been called “bootstrapping” is but an attempt to justify 
knowledge claims through a form of a circular reasoning that switches 
from the first to the second epistemic level. That’s why bootstrapping is 
one strategy – unacceptable for both cohen and the pyrrhonians – to deal 
with the problem of the criterion. of course, any explanation we may find 
of bootstrapping is much sharper and sophisticated than anything we 
can find in Sextus Empiricus. Then again, this does not opaque the fact 
that circular reasoning for the problem of the criterion and bootstrapping 
are the same thing.
on the same token, what cohen calls easy, the pyrrhonian see as plainly 
inadequate. The only way to understand the meaning of “easy knowledge” 
is that it designates the inappropriateness of one sort of knowledge 
acquisition. The idea of “easy knowledge” hides the conception that this 
“easy” means “too easy,” “unbearably easy.” In one word, “unacceptable.”
Summing things up: when we talk about the reliability of a belief 
process formation, we could bootstrap in order to come to know that 
the process is reliable; when we talk about reasons, we could bootstrap 
in order to come to know that we have adequate reasons to believe the 
things we do. In both cases the problem seems to reside on the limitation 
of the requirements of what would be necessary in order to be justified 
in believing some proposition. Exactly because it is not required for S to 
have any clue about the epistemic quality of the reasons (or methods) 
she uses to believe the things she does, she will be able to use the 
epistemic good (or bad!) resultant beliefs she has to prove the epistemic 
quality of the reasons or (methods) she uses to believe. And this may 
be done independently of the fact that the reasons are adequate or the 
methods are reliable. That’s the problem with what cohen calls basic 
knowledge structure views. The skeptical conclusion would be that just 
a reliable method, or just a proper reason, seems not to be enough to 
deliver justified beliefs.
whether we talk about either reasons or methods of belief formation, 
we will be trapped into a circular form of reasoning that establishes 
unacceptable bridges between first and second epistemic levels.
There are a number of forms to manifest dissatisfaction with this 
kind of restrictions. I think it is exactly what lehrer was saying with 
“examples of alleged knowledge in which a person does not know that 
the information he accepts is correct my be of some philosophical interest 
but such knowledge falls outside the concern of knowledge used in a 
way that is characteristically human in critical reasoning and the life of 
reason”.22
22  See Keith lehrer, op. cit., p. 41.127
In some sense, the problem of the criterion and bootstrapping can be 
seen as demonstrating what is wrong with this sense of “knowledge” 
when the person ignores the information accepted is correct – or ignores 
that the reason is epistemically good, or that the process is reliable.23
I’ll repeat, it doesn’t matter if the processes are in fact reliable or if the 
reasons are in fact good. one could think that using the results of some 
process to prove the reliability of it is legitimate just in case the process 
is in fact reliable. Such strategy fails because it is in itself inadequate, 
and this is so because such a strategy is trivial, it will always give the 
same result: the processes are reliable, even when they aren’t.
So, this is the problem of bootstrapping. There are theories that 
independently of their internalistic or externalistic brand will face the 
problem of allowing this kind of meta-circularity, the bootstrapping 
strategy, and bootstrapping has to do with acquiring second-order 
knowledge through a form of reasoning that inadequately connects first 
and second epistemic levels.
If we think about Goldman’s suggestion that “a plausible theory ought 
to have the property that knowing that one knows is more difficult than 
simply knowing”,24 we will find bootstrapping, or circular reasoning, 
as a way to make second-order knowledge somehow less difficult than 
first-order knowledge.
Conclusion
one optimistic way to describe what we have seen would be to say 
something like this: instead of one problem that emerges in two different 
forms, cohen has two quite different problems at stake when he discusses 
the easy knowledge problem. one of them is the meta-epistemological 
question posed by the KR principle, which is represented by the 
inadequate acquisition of reliability knowledge through bootstrapping. 
The other is the supposedly inadequate knowledge acquired through 
the closure principle.
Accordingly, the difference between closure and bootstrapping 
is a fundamental one: closure does not motivate any “easy” second-
order knowledge acquisition. he apparently failed to notice that there 
exist two different things subsumed in what he called “the problem of 
easy knowledge.” differently from closure, bootstrapping is a way to   
 
23  I guess to lehrer the question is a bit different, since he seems to reject the very 
idea that we could gain knowledge in the way described: “if I read some gauge or 
meter and believe the information I received, though I have no idea whether the 
instrument is functioning properly, I may thus acquire information, but this is not 
knowledge.” See Keith lehrer, op. cit., p. 6.
24  See Alvin Goldman, op. cit., p. 57.128
come to know that our belief sources are reliable, that our reasons are 
epistemically appropriate. Then, it has a meta-knowledge nature. This 
difference is crucial.
The closure principle does not motivate any easy knowledge problem 
as bootstrapping does. In the worst hypothesis, closure is related to the 
problem of deciding if we can reason like this: it seems red, thus it is red. 
bootstrapping, on the other hand, is related to the problem of coming to 
know that we know in a way in which we can reach the conclusion that 
we know that we know even if we do not know in the first place. Those 
are quite different problems.
cohen – and many epistemologists after him – does not observe 
the important difference between the two supposed ways in which the 
problem of easy knowledge arises. he didn’t notice that there exists 
a difference regarding epistemic levels. If this is right, there is some 
level confusion lurking in his talk about the easy knowledge problem. 
he should have observed that there were two different problems – one 
related to the easy acquisition of first-order knowledge by closure, and 
the other one related to the easy acquisition of second-order knowledge 
by bootstrapping – that require two quite different analyses.
on a less optimistic description – the one I think is correct – we’ll have 
to say that there is no easy knowledge problem. To begin with, there is 
no problem at all with the closure principle. Thus, the closure principle 
does not motivate any easy knowledge problem. The real problem cohen 
is dealing with is to decide – how, how much, to what extent, etc. – 
the appearances of things can be the base for our knowledge of the 
world.
In the bootstrapping case, cohen is, again, battling against a very old 
and complicated problem: namely, the problem of the criterion. however, 
differently from the case about the closure principle, his description of 
the problem seems to be quite interesting. nevertheless, he is mistaken 
to imagine a new problem, the easy knowledge problem.
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